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When Does a Party Prevail?: A Proposed “Third-Circuit-
Plus” Test for Judicial Imprimatur 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress has encouraged individual plaintiffs to bring civil rights 
lawsuits by providing that their attorney’s fees will be paid for if a judge 
deems them to be the “prevailing party.”1 Congress utilizes these fee-
shifting statutes to further important public policies by allowing private 
citizens to bring suits to protect their civil rights.2 However, when parties 
resolve their suits via private settlement, the question of whether a party 
has “prevailed” is not always easily answered. Federal courts of appeals 
have split three ways on the questions of whether a party to a private 
settlement may be considered a prevailing party, and if so, what degree 
of judicial involvement is required for such a determination. This circuit 
split results in varying availability of attorney’s fees to civil rights 
plaintiffs throughout the country. This disagreement among circuits thus 
undermines Congress’s public policy of encouraging “private attorneys 
general” that underlies the fee-shifting statutory regimes.3
This split of authority stems from the Supreme Court’s lack of 
guidance in its most recent attorney’s fees case, Buckhannon Board and 
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human 
Resources.4 There the Court eliminated the “catalyst theory”—a widely 
 1. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) (2000); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) 
(2000); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000); Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (2000); see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43–51 
(1985) (appendix to opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting); Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees 
Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 439–40; Robin Stanley, Note, 
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human 
Resources: To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils . . . and the Attorney’s Fees!, 36 AKRON L. REV. 
363, 368 (2003) (“Congress introduced fee-shifting statutes to encourage individuals to use private 
enforcement for the implementation of public policies.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 183, 186 (“The idea behind the ‘private attorney general’ can be stated relatively simply: 
Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by empowering private individuals to bring 
suit.”). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
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used test5 for determining prevailing party status—by adhering to a strict 
interpretation of the “plain language”6 of the fee-shifting statutes. The 
Court reasoned that the catalyst theory permitted fee awards in the 
absence of any court-ordered or judicially sanctioned change in the 
parties’ legal relationship.7 To illustrate, the Court explained that both a 
judgment on the merits and a consent decree involved the necessary 
judicial approval and oversight to provide prevailing party status.8 
However, it failed to adequately delineate the parameters of prevailing 
party status in the private settlement context. This failure has led to a 
divergence of views as to how much judicial imprimatur in the resolution 
of a lawsuit is required before a party can be said to have “prevailed.”9 
This question gains importance in light of the various ways in which a 
suit may end. 
The level of judicial imprimatur in the resolution of a suit varies 
according to the manner in which a suit concludes. If a case actually 
culminates in a trial verdict, the prevailing party is readily ascertainable 
because the judgment on the merits bears full judicial sanction. However, 
not all cases are tried to conclusion, as parties often negotiate a 
settlement prior to litigation in order to save costs.10 Parties wishing to 
resolve a dispute prior to litigation may enter their private agreement as 
an official judgment of the court, known as a consent decree.11 This 
action bears the highest level of judicial involvement short of proceeding 
to trial. Alternatively, parties may enter a purely private settlement12 and 
 5. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600–02. Prior to Buckhannon, a party could “prevail” under the 
catalyst theory if it achieved a favorable result on any issue in its suit, even if the defendant’s change 
in behavior was voluntary and unconnected with any judicial decree. See infra Part III.A. In 
Buckhannon, the Court struck down the catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing party status and 
ruled that a party only prevails when it obtains actual judicial relief. See infra Parts III.B. The theory 
is so named because the prevailing party’s lawsuit, or threat thereof, has acted as a catalyst to 
achieve the desired result, even if that result occurred through a defendant’s voluntary cessation of 
allegedly offending activities. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429–30 (8th 
Cir. 1970) (“[The plaintiff]’s lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the [defendant] to take 
action . . . seeking compliance with the requirements of Title VII.”). 
 6. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 
 7. See infra notes 88–97 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 33. 
 11. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 12. As used in this Comment, the term “purely private settlement” denotes a private 
settlement that has been negotiated between the parties, who then stipulate to a dismissal of the 
action by the court. Purely private settlements are distinguished from those situations in which the 
terms of the settlement are incorporated into the court order dismissing a case. See infra note 113. 
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petition the judge to enter a stipulated dismissal order.13 Such an action 
generally bears the least judicial imprimatur. Parties may also opt for a 
resolution somewhere between private settlements and consent decrees 
on the spectrum of judicial involvement.14  
The three-way split among the circuits revolves around whether a 
party to a private settlement that falls short of a consent decree can ever 
be termed a prevailing party. Contrary to the majority of circuits 
interpreting the issue, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a party with 
nothing more than a private settlement may be awarded fees as a 
prevailing party.15 At the other end of the spectrum, the Eighth Circuit 
has ruled that nothing short of a consent decree or a judgment on the 
merits may serve as the basis for prevailing party status.16 Finding a 
middle ground, and representative of the majority of circuits to have 
considered the issue, the Third Circuit ruled that a party with a settlement 
agreement may be a prevailing party if the settlement bears sufficient 
judicial imprimatur.17
This Comment argues that of the various approaches taken by the 
circuits, the Third Circuit’s comes closest to satisfying the Supreme 
Court’s concerns regarding judicial approval and oversight. However, 
while the Third Circuit’s test satisfies the Court’s concern regarding 
oversight, it fails to satisfy the concern regarding approval. A good 
remedying test should clearly spell out the level of judicial oversight and 
approval that gives rise to prevailing party status.18 Therefore, the Third 
Circuit’s test should be augmented by adding an explicit merits-review 
requirement to create a “Third-Circuit-plus” test. Because Buckhannon 
was decided in the context of two civil rights laws, this Comment 
addresses the various policy concerns from the viewpoint of furthering 
Congress’s civil rights public policy. The proposed test could also apply 
to other federal statutory regimes.19
Part II of this Comment examines the history of the Supreme Court’s 
prevailing party jurisprudence prior to Buckhannon. Part III analyzes the 
 13. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 14. A court may incorporate the private settlement terms into the order of dismissal and/or 
explicitly retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. See infra Part II.B.3 and accompanying 
text. 
 15. See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. See infra Part IV.B. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C. 
 18. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court decision in Buckhannon, focusing on its concerns 
regarding “judicial imprimatur.” Part IV presents the ensuing 
disagreements among the circuit courts regarding how much judicial 
imprimatur in a private settlement is sufficient to bestow prevailing party 
status. Part V argues that the competing approaches taken by the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits are overly restrictive and overly broad respectively 
and then proposes a judicial imprimatur test based on the Third Circuit’s 
approach in Truesdell. Part VI concludes this Comment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Part first analyzes the “American Rule” of attorney’s fees and 
the purposes behind fee-shifting statutes. It next explores the 
characteristics of the various litigation conclusion mechanisms—purely 
private settlements, consent decrees, and those that fall somewhere 
between the two in terms of the level of judicial involvement. The 
approaches of the various circuits are founded upon a distinction in the 
level of judicial involvement in purely private settlements versus consent 
decrees. As a threshold matter, one must understand the distinguishing 
characteristics of these two dismissal mechanisms. 
A. The “American Rule” and Fee-Shifting Statutes 
Undergirding the Court’s “prevailing party” jurisprudence is the 
default “American rule,” under which each side bears the burden of 
paying its own attorney’s fees—in other words, the “prevailing party is 
not entitled to collect from the loser.”20 However, several federal courts 
created a “private attorney general exception to the traditional American 
rule,” which recognized that “[w]here the law relies on private suits to 
effectuate congressional policy in favor of broad public interests, 
attorney’s fees are often necessary to ensure that private litigants will 
initiate such suits.”21 On the heels of the Supreme Court’s disapproval of 
this judicially created right to a fee award,22 Congress passed the Civil 
 20. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 602 (2001) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)). 
 21. Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029–30 (D.C. Cir. 1974), overruled by 
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263; see also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 439; Karlan, supra note 2, at 186–87; 
Daniel Steuer, Another Brick in the Wall: Attorney’s Fees for the Civil Rights Litigant After 
Buckhannon, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 53, 53–54 (2004). 
 22. The Court in Alyeska ruled that courts did not have the authority to award fees to 
prevailing parties under any common-law theory, but could only do so under explicit statutory 
authority. 421 U.S. at 263. 
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Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act23 to explicitly provide a prevailing 
party the right to a fee award when vindicating rights under federal civil 
rights law.24
In these statutes, Congress specifically encourages private citizens to 
act as “private attorneys general” by providing for fee shifting.25 Indeed, 
one commentator has described “prevailing party” fee shifting as the 
“fuel that drives the private attorney general engine.”26 Absent fee 
shifting, few if any private parties would have the economic ability to see 
a civil rights action through to completion.27 This Comment focuses on 
the policy behind the various civil rights statutes, although there are 
many other federal statutory regimes that allow for “prevailing party” fee 
shifting.28 Given that Buckhannon has consistently been applied to 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2004). 
 24. See supra note 1. Less often, federal statutes allow a court to award attorney’s fees 
“whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.” Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1540(g)(4) (2000); see, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) 
(2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f), 7622(e)(2) (2000). The Supreme Court has 
recognized that Congress intended for these “whenever appropriate” fee-shifting statutes “to expand 
the class of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties—
parties achieving some success, even if not major success.” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 
680, 688 (1983). Hence, courts following Buckhannon have consistently maintained the catalyst 
theory as available for fee shifting in those statutes. See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 
307 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e agree that Buckhannon does not invalidate use of the 
catalyst test as a basis for awarding attorney’s fees under the [Endangered Species Act] . . . .”). 
 25. The Court has recognized: 
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would 
prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a 
means of securing broad compliance with the law . . . . If successful plaintiffs were 
routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a 
position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal 
courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees—not simply to penalize 
litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more 
broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief 
under Title II. 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968). There are over one hundred 
federal statutes that award fees to the “prevailing party.” See Marek, 473 U.S. at 43–51 (appendix to 
opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 26. Karlan, supra note 2, at 205. 
 27. Id. at 205–06 (“[M]ost civil rights plaintiffs are unable to afford counsel and without a 
fees statute, the available counsel would be limited to attorneys willing to represent them pro 
bono.”). 
 28. Many of the arguments presented in this Comment could be imported into those contexts. 
The contexts of federal legislation other than civil rights in which Buckhannon’s construction of 
“prevailing party” applies include: special education, voting rights, freedom of information, fair 
credit reporting, endangered species protection, and employee retirement income. See, e.g., Lucia A. 
Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation and a 
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“prevailing party” fee-shifting statutes outside the civil rights context,29 
it is important that courts adopt a consistent approach to fee shifting that 
best serves Congress’s intent to encourage private citizen suits through 
the availability of fee shifting.30  
B. The Continuum of Litigation-Conclusion Mechanisms  
Short of Final Judgments 
The circuits split when deciding whether parties may be considered 
to have prevailed in situations falling between private settlements on the 
one hand and consent decrees on the other. Private settlements are 
contractual by nature—that is, they represent an agreement between two 
private parties. Consent decrees, on the other hand, are a hybrid of 
private contract and judicial decree.31 Additionally, parties may enter 
into dismissals that ultimately entail a degree of judicial involvement 
more than private settlements but somewhat less than consent decrees. 
Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 n.9 (2004) (collecting articles) 
(“Because environmental law relies heavily on citizen suits, those in the environmental arena 
speculated on what the Court’s interpretation of ‘prevailing party’ in Buckhannon might mean in that 
context.”); Stanley, supra note 1, at 368 n.28 (citing various federal statutes containing “prevailing 
party” fee-shifting provisions); Mark C. Weber, Special Education Attorneys’ Fees After 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human 
Resources, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 273. 
 29. The Court in Buckhannon recognized that it interprets all “fee-shifting provisions 
consistently.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001). See generally Silecchia, supra note 28, at 41–42 (“[N]early every court 
that has required a prevailing party as a prerequisite to fee recovery has applied Buckhannon’s 
judicial imprimatur test to reject catalyst claims.”) (quoting Kyle A. Loring, Note, Catalyst Theory 
Meets the Supreme Court—Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 993 (2002)). 
 30. One commentator has noted that because some environmental protection statutes include 
“prevailing party” language while others include “whenever appropriate” language, “the availability 
of the catalyst theory is now automatically barred in one set of environmental statutes and yet still 
viable in another.” Silecchia, supra note 28, at 61. Silecchia later observes, 
There seems to be no clear distinction between environmental statutes employing the two 
different standards. For example, the [Clean Air Act] and the [Clean Water Act] use 
different standards, although there is no compelling reason to do so. Moreover, having 
two standards can create confusion. Absent a true difference in the citizen enforcement 
regimes of the statutes that employ these standards, there seems to be no reason to 
continue to have two different standards. 
Id. at 81; see also Stanley, supra note 1, at 396–97 (“Those particularly harmed are plaintiffs 
enforcing several environmental fee-shifting statutes where damages are not recoverable and only 
injunctive relief is available.”); Marisa Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After 
Buckhannon Board & Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 8 
ENVTL. LAW. 589, 608–09 (2002) (“[T]he Buckhannon decision inevitably results in an illogical and 
unjustifiable inconsistency in the enforcement of federal environmental laws.”). 
 31. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
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This Part will first discuss consent decree characteristics and then will 
explore the contrasting elements of purely private settlements. It 
concludes with a look at the characteristics—in terms of judicial 
involvement—of those dismissals that fall between private settlements 
and consent decrees on the continuum of judicial involvement. 
1. Consent decrees 
A consent decree is “an agreement that the parties desire and expect 
will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is 
subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and 
decrees.”32 Although the agreement underlying the consent decree is a 
private agreement, the parties submit that agreement to the court for 
incorporation into a formal decree.33 A judge’s involvement is fairly 
extensive. A judge cannot merely rubber stamp a consent decree. On the 
contrary, a judge “must review a consent decree to ensure that it is ‘fair, 
adequate, and reasonable; that the proposed decree will not violate the 
Constitution, a statute or other authority; [and] that it is consistent with 
the objectives of Congress.’”34 This fairness review is a key 
characteristic that distinguishes consent decrees from purely private 
settlements. 
Additionally, courts have recognized that in deciding whether to 
approve a consent decree, the trial judge must “consider the nature of the 
litigation and the purposes to be served by the decree.”35 Thus, for 
example, it is appropriate for a judge to consider the extent to which a 
consent decree furthers congressional purposes when the original suit 
was brought under federal civil rights laws. Accordingly, “the decree 
must be consistent with the public objectives sought to be attained by 
Congress.”36 These factors illustrate a judge’s high level of involvement 
 
 32. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992); see also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “consent decree” as “[a] court decree that all parties 
agree to”). 
 33. The Supreme Court has recognized that a consent decree is “primarily a means by which 
parties settle their disputes without having to bear the financial and other costs of litigating.” Local 
No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528 (1986).
 34. Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 
1993) (quoting Durrett v. Hous. Auth., 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D 
Judgments § 216 (2004).
 35. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d. 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (Rubin, 
J., concurring). 
 36. Id. (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 
(7th Cir. 1980)). 
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in the consent decree process. Specifically, before approving a consent 
decree, a judge should determine that the proposed settlement “represents 
a reasonable factual and legal determination based on the facts of 
record.”37 Without being an actual review of the merits, this factual and 
legal determination that the settlement is reasonable reflects the judicial 
stamp of approval necessary for any official court decree. 
Because of its unique nature, scholars have described the consent 
decree as “a kind of legal hermaphrodite, with characteristics both of a 
contract and of a court order.”38 Courts have recognized that the “dual 
character . . . ‘result[s] in different treatment for different purposes.’”39 
Because it is a decree, a consent decree is enforceable “by judicial 
sanctions, including citation for contempt if it is violated.”40 
Accordingly, consent decrees are desirable to parties because they have 
“the force of res judicata, protecting the parties from future litigation,” 
while saving “the time, expense, and . . . psychological toll [as well as] 
the inevitable risk of litigation.”41
 37. Id. 
 38. Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and 
the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 894; see also United States v. 
ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237 n.10 (1975) (“Consent decrees and orders have attributes 
both of contracts and of judicial decrees.”); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2002). The 
court in Smyth cites to Judge Rubin’s concurrence in City of Miami: 
Because the consent decree does not merely validate a compromise but, by virtue of its 
injunctive provisions, reaches into the future and has continuing effect, its terms require 
more careful scrutiny. Even when it affects only the parties, the court should, therefore, 
examine it carefully to ascertain not only that it is a fair settlement but also that it does 
not put the court’s sanction on and power behind a decree that violates Constitution, 
statute, or jurisprudence. 
664 F.2d at 441 (comparing level of judicial scrutiny in consent decree to that employed in review of 
a class action settlement). 
 39. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 280 (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986)). 
 40. City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 440. For a discussion of why the contempt power is important 
in the prevailing party analysis, see infra Part V.B.2. Parties may value this retained jurisdiction 
because it gives them an easier way to obtain subsequent enforcement of the settlement than if they 
had a purely private settlement. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 224 (2004). 
 41. City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 439. The court points out that if parties settle by way of purely 
private contract, “the only penalty for failure to abide by the agreement is another suit.” Id.; see infra 
note 47 and accompanying text.
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2. Purely private settlements 
Purely private settlements are distinct from consent decrees in the 
level of both judicial approval and judicial oversight.42 First, private 
settlements “ordinarily do[] not receive the approval of the court.”43 
Typically, when two parties have reached a private settlement they will 
then stipulate to a dismissal of the suit.44 A judge’s involvement is 
minimal45 and is limited to ensuring that the defendant is not seriously 
prejudiced.46  
Private settlements are also distinguished from consent decrees in 
terms of enforcement. Clear Supreme Court precedent establishes that a 
federal court’s inherent authority does not support “an assertion of 
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement entered into by the parties 
and resulting in dismissal of the case pursuant to a stipulation by the 
parties.”47 Therefore, any breach of the terms of a purely private 
settlement agreement gives rise to a claim for breach of contract but not 
for contempt of court as is available under a consent decree. 
3. Dismissal orders incorporating settlement terms 
As an alternative to either a purely private settlement or a consent 
decree, parties may opt for an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. 
Often, after parties conclude settlement negotiations, they will want the 
court to retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the agreement. If 
parties do not want the settlement memorialized in a consent decree, they 
may seek retained jurisdiction by requesting that the judge either 
incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement into the order of 
dismissal or include a separate provision in the dismissal order 
 42. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 280–81. See infra note 113. 
 43. Id. at 280. Other circuit courts have also recognized that “[t]here are only certain 
designated types of suits, for instance consent decrees, class actions, shareholder derivative suits, 
and compromises of bankruptcy claims where settlement of the suit requires court approval.” Caplan 
v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 835 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) provides for a voluntary dismissal by stipulation of both parties. 
See generally 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 41.01–41.34 (3rd ed. 
1998). 
 45. See infra notes 190, 194 and accompanying text. 
 46. 8 MOORE, supra note 44, § 41.01(2). 
 47. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 282 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 
379–81 (1994)). 
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acknowledging the settlement agreement and specifically retaining 
jurisdiction to enforce its terms.48  
The primary distinction between an incorporated settlement 
agreement and a consent decree is the level of judicial approval. In 
consent decrees, the judge is required to sign off on the fairness of the 
settlement through a formal “fairness hearing.”49 By contrast, nothing 
requires a judge to perform any kind of review of the terms of a 
settlement when those terms are simply incorporated into the dismissal 
order. Presumably, a judge would undertake a cursory review of the 
incorporated settlement terms pursuant to its general “responsibility to 
ensure that its orders are fair and lawful.”50 Incorporated settlements can 
thus be viewed on the continuum as involving more judicial imprimatur 
than purely private settlements but somewhat less than consent decrees. 
The issue of whether incorporated settlements should be considered as 
the functional equivalent of consent decrees lies at the heart of the 
ensuing post-Buckhannon debate. 
III. SUPREME COURT PREVAILING PARTY JURISPRUDENCE 
A review of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements prior to 
Buckhannon reveals some contours of the requirements for prevailing 
party status. Taken as a whole, the pre-Buckhannon fees cases present 
three general requirements for a determination of prevailing party status: 
(1) a judicial determination that a party has achieved success on the 
merits, (2) direct relief at the time of the judgment or settlement, and (3) 
a court-ordered sanctioning of a material alteration in the parties’ legal 
relationship. The Court has upheld a fee award only in situations where 
there is sufficient judicial imprimatur in the dismissal.51 This Part first 
reviews the Court’s prevailing party decisions decided prior to 
Buckhannon. This Part then examines the Buckhannon decision and its 
implications for parties seeking to secure prevailing party status. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 50. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 282. 
 51. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 606 (2001) (“Never have we awarded attorney’s fees for a nonjudicial alteration of actual 
circumstances.” (internal cross-reference omitted)); infra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
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A. Decisions Prior to Buckhannon 
Through a series of early decisions, the Court provided guidelines 
regarding what constitutes a prevailing party for federal fee-shifting 
statutes. In Hewitt v. Helms,52 the Court elaborated a merit requirement, 
which requires that a plaintiff achieve some judicial determination that 
he has “receive[d] at least some relief on the merits of his claim before 
he can be said to prevail,”53 either at the conclusion of litigation or at any 
interlocutory stage.54 This does not mean that a party must receive a 
formal adjudication in the form of a judgment on the merits. The Court 
recognized in Maher v. Gagne55 that a litigant can receive a fee award 
when “prevail[ing] through a settlement rather than through litigation.”56 
The Court also recognized that a party to a consent decree may also be a 
prevailing party.57 A judge reviewing a consent decree must examine the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim, albeit to a lesser extent than in a judgment 
on the merits, to make sure that prevailing party status is not awarded to 
 52. 482 U.S. 755 (1987). 
 53. Id. at 760. Hewitt involved a former inmate who “brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against a number of prison officials, alleging that the lack of a prompt hearing on his misconduct 
charges and his conviction for misconduct on the basis of uncorroborated hearsay testimony violated 
his rights to due process.” Id. at 757. The inmate was released on parole prior to the adjudication of 
his suit. Id. While his suit was pending, the state Bureau of Corrections amended its policies. Id. at 
759. Upon motion for attorney’s fees as a prevailing party, the Third Circuit held that its prior ruling 
that the plaintiff’s constitutional due process rights had been violated while still incarcerated was a 
form of judicial relief sufficient to grant prevailing party status. Id. at 759.  
The Court noted that “[t]he most that [the plaintiff] obtained was an interlocutory ruling that 
his complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim. That is not 
the stuff of which legal victories are made.” Id. at 760. Although the Court did not precisely define 
the term “prevailing party,” it did state that “[w]hatever the outer boundaries of that term may be, 
Helms does not fit within them.” Id. at 759–60. The Court thus established that purely procedural 
victories, such as here surviving a motion to dismiss, did not have sufficient judicial determination 
of the merits to base an award of attorney’s fees. 
 54. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (“Congress intended to permit the 
interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his 
claims.”). 
 55. 448 U.S. 122 (1980). 
 56. Id. at 129. The Court cited to a Senate report for 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which stated that “for 
purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they 
vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.” Id. (citing S. REP. 
NO. 94-1011). 
 57. Id. (“[T]he Senate Report expressly stated that ‘for purposes of the award of counsel fees, 
parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment 
or without formally obtaining relief.’”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912). 
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one who brings a “nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless 
lawsuit.”58  
In addition to the merit requirement, the Court has elaborated both a 
timing requirement and a material alteration requirement. The timing 
requirement simply requires that “[w]hatever relief the plaintiff secures 
must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement.”59 
The material alteration requirement mandates that a party prevails for 
fee-shifting purposes only when there has been a “material alteration of 
the legal relationship of the parties.”60 In other words, a prevailing party 
must be able to point to “a resolution of the dispute which changes the 
legal relationship between itself and the defendant.”61 This material 
alteration requirement is separate from the merit requirement in the sense 
that a settlement may alter the legal relationship between two parties 
even when the judge has not evaluated the merits of the plaintiff’s 
underlying claims.  
Concurrent with these Supreme Court pronouncements, the federal 
courts of appeals developed the catalyst theory, under which courts 
consider a plaintiff the “‘prevailing party’ if [the party] achieves the 
desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in 
the defendant’s conduct.”62 The catalyst theory served the purpose of the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act by encouraging impecunious 
clients to enforce their rights.63 Most circuits adopted the catalyst theory 
for federal fee-shifting statutes on the theory that, defined in its “practical 
sense,”64 the term “prevailing party” allows for fee shifting when a 
party’s “ends are accomplished as a result of the litigation.”65
 58. Id. at 606. 
 59. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). 
 60. Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989) 
(describing the material alteration in the legal relationship as the “touchstone” of prevailing party 
status). 
 61. Id. at 792; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“[P]laintiffs may be 
considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in 
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”) (quoting Nadeau 
v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 1978)). 
 62. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 601 (2001). The Eighth Circuit was the first court of appeals to recognize the catalyst theory. 
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429–30 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 63. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
 64. Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Dawson v. Patrick, 600 
F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
 65. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 378 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir. 1982)). Prior to Farrar all 
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The Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Farrar v. Hobby66 provided 
“one of the clearest formulations of the prevailing party jurisprudence”67 
while at the same time casting doubt on the continued viability of the 
catalyst theory. The Court summarized its prior rulings68 and enumerated 
the necessary components of “prevailing party” status: a party (1) “must 
obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim”;69 (2) must be 
directly benefited by the relief “at the time of the judgment or 
settlement”;70 and (3) must have secured a “material alteration of the 
legal relationship of the parties.”71 Although the Fourth Circuit read 
Farrar as vitiating the catalyst theory,72 the vast majority of circuit 
courts reaffirmed the continued viability of the catalyst theory after 
circuit courts recognized the catalyst theory. See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 279–81; Gerena-Valentin v. 
Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 758–59 (2d Cir. 1984); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 
758 F.2d 897, 910–17 (3d Cir. 1985); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979); 
Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465–67 (5th Cir. 1981); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. 
Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 985 F.2d 255, 257–58 (6th Cir. 1993); Stewart, 675 F.2d at 
851; Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980); Am. Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 
F.2d 184, 187–88 (9th Cir. 1981); J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474–75 (10th Cir. 
1985); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379–80 (11th Cir. 1982); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 
1108–10 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 66. 506 U.S. 103 (1992). 
 67. Walker v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing Farrar). 
 68. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 108–12.  
 69. Id. at 111 (citing as examples “enforceable judgment against the defendant . . . or 
comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement” (internal citations omitted)). 
 70. Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 764 (1987)). 
 71. Id. (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–
93 (1989)). The Court condensed these factors into a more succinct statement: “In short, a plaintiff 
‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship 
between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the 
plaintiff.” Id. at 111–12.  
 72. S-1 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994). The Farrar Court explained, 
“Of itself, ‘the moral satisfaction [that] results from any favorable statement of law’ cannot bestow 
prevailing party status. No material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs 
until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the 
defendant.” 506 U.S. at 112–13 (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit interpreted this language to 
stand for the proposition that “[a] person may not be a ‘prevailing party’ plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 
1988 except by virtue of having obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement 
giving some of the legal relief sought in a § 1983 action.” S-1, 21 F.3d at 51. The court then cited to 
Farrar as justification for its holding that the catalyst theory was “no longer available.” Id. The 
Supreme Court later recognized, however, that Farrar “involved no catalytic effect,” Friends of 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 194 (2000), and that the fate of the 
catalyst theory was still “an open question.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.5 (2001).  
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Farrar.73 The circuit courts based their decisions to reaffirm the catalyst 
theory on the grounds that Congressional intent in passing the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act required a broad definition of 
prevailing party.74
Prior to Buckhannon, the Supreme Court had a fairly extensive 
history of interpreting fee-shifting statutes and deciding what constituted 
prevailing party status. This jurisprudence coexisted with a large body of 
circuit court precedent advocating the use of the catalyst theory. Indeed, 
at the time of Buckhannon, all but one of the circuit courts adhered to a 
broad interpretation of “prevailing party” and embraced the catalyst 
theory in order to satisfy the policy considerations of federal fee-shifting 
statutes.75 However, those policy considerations would not save the 
catalyst theory from the buzz saw of Buckhannon’s literalist reading of 
the statutes. 
B. The Buckhannon Decision 
In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court considered whether the catalyst 
theory was a proper basis for “prevailing party” status. Buckhannon’s 
lack of sufficient guidance regarding how to precisely delineate the 
bounds of the term “prevailing party” has led to confusion among the 
circuit courts.76  
1. The background of Buckhannon 
In 1997, the state of West Virginia decided that the Buckhannon 
Board and Care Home had violated a state law that required “all residents 
of residential board and care homes be capable of ‘self-preservation,’ or 
capable of moving themselves ‘from situations involving imminent 
 73. See Stanton v. S. Berkshire Reg’l Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 
541, 546–50 (3d Cir. 1994); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397–98 (6th Cir. 1996); Zinn v. 
Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski City Sch. Dist., # 1, 17 
F.3d 260, 263 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Beard v. 
Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951–52 (10th Cir. 1994); Morris v. W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
 74. See, e.g., Baumgartner, 21 F.3d at 548 (“[F]rom a policy standpoint, if defendants could 
deprive plaintiffs of attorney’s fees by unilaterally mooting the underlying case by conceding to 
plaintiffs’ demands, attorneys might be more hesitant about bringing these civil rights suits, a result 
inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting section 1988.”). 
 75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra Part IV. 
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danger, such as fire.’”77 After the state ordered it to cease and desist its 
operations, Buckhannon filed suit78 alleging that the state’s “self-
preservation” requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988 (FHAA)79 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA).80 Soon thereafter, the state legislature eliminated the “self-
preservation” requirement,81 and the district court subsequently granted 
the state’s motion to dismiss the case as moot.82 Following dismissal, the 
plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees, arguing that their suit acted as a catalyst 
to the legislative change in the law.83 The district court held that the 
plaintiffs were not prevailing parties based on the Fourth Circuit’s earlier 
precedent rejecting the catalyst theory,84 a decision which the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion.85
2. The Supreme Court opinion 
In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s 
rejection of the catalyst theory.86 The Court refused to rely on policy 
considerations to determine the meaning of “prevailing party”; rather, it 
turned to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “prevailing party” as 
“[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the 
amount of damages awarded.”87 The Court reiterated its prior holding 
that a plain textual reading requires a party to receive “at least some 
relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.”88 This 
ran counter to the broad application of the catalyst theory, which 
 77. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600 (quoting W. VA. CODE §§ 16-5H-1 to 16-5H-2 (1998)). 
 78. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 203 F.3d 
819 (Table), 2000 WL 42250, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2000). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2000). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
 81. Buckhannon, 2000 WL 42250, at *1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 609 (2001). Both statutes provide for an award of attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party.” 42 
U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. 
 84. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601 (citing S-1 v. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 
1994)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. In a five to four split, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion for 
himself and Justices Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor, and Kennedy. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the dissent, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. 
 87. Id. at 603 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)). 
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permitted a fee award if the plaintiff could show “that the ‘complaint had 
sufficient merit to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
or failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.’”89 The 
catalyst theory also permitted a party to recover attorney’s fees in 
situations “where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ 
legal relationship.”90 The Court’s adherence to the plain meaning of the 
term “prevailing party” required a rejection of the catalyst theory. 
The Court synthesized from its prior decisions a rule that a party 
only “prevails” when the change in the legal relationship between the 
two parties has sufficient “judicial imprimatur.”91 As examples of 
situations entailing a sufficient level of judicial imprimatur to permit a 
fee award, the Court mentioned both a judgment on the merits92 and a 
consent decree.93 Both resolutions involve a sufficient “court-ordered 
‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the 
defendant.’”94 By contrast, the Court viewed the catalyst theory as 
falling “on the other side of the line from these examples.”95 In footnote 
seven of the opinion, the Court rejected dicta from its earlier cases that 
“allow[ed] for an award of attorney’s fees for private settlements.”96 The 
Court explicitly stated that private settlements “do not entail the judicial 
approval and oversight involved in consent decrees.”97
 89. Id. at 605 (citation omitted). 
 90. Id. The Court further noted that the term “prevailing party” does not “authorize[] federal 
courts to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless 
potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), has reached the ‘sought-after destination’ 
without obtaining any judicial relief.” Id. (internal cross-reference omitted). 
 91. Id. The Court reasoned that “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although 
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary 
judicial imprimatur on the change.” Id. 
 92. Id. at 604. The Court in Hanrahan v. Hampton declared that “Congress intended to 
permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least 
some of his claims.” 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980). The Court recognized that “even an award of 
nominal damages suffices under this test.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (citing to Farrar v. Hobby, 
506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992)). 
 93. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (citing to Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980)). A consent 
decree is “[a] court decree that all parties agree to.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed. 1999); 
see infra Part II.B.1. 
 94. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)). 
 95. Id. at 605. 
 96. Id. at 604 n.7. 
 97. Id. (“And federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be 
lacking unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.”); see also 
infra note 108. 
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Although Buckhannon recognized the legislative history of the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and various policy considerations for 
upholding the catalyst theory,98 the Court found the “legislative 
history . . . clearly insufficient to alter the accepted meaning of the 
statutory term”99 and eschewed any “roving [judicial] authority” to 
“disregard the clear legislative language . . . on the basis of . . . policy 
arguments.”100 The Court concluded by restating the principle that “[a] 
request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major 
litigation.”101 The Court also expressed concern that the case-by-case 
“analysis of the defendant’s subjective motivations in changing its 
conduct,” required by the catalyst theory, was “clearly not a formula for 
‘ready administrability.’”102
3. What Buckhannon adds to the prevailing party jurisprudence 
In order to “prevail” prior to Buckhannon, a party must have 
received “actual relief on the merits of his claim [that] materially alters 
the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s 
behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.”103 Buckhannon 
clarified the existing rule by requiring that the “chang[e] [in] the legal 
 98. See infra note 100; supra Part II.A. 
 99. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608. 
 100. Id. at 610. The petitioners asserted that “the ‘catalyst theory’ [was] necessary to prevent 
defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award of 
attorney’s fees.” Id. at 608. Furthermore, petitioners argued that abandoning “the ‘catalyst theory’ 
[would] deter plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit.” Id. The Court 
rejected this argument, pointing out that the catalyst theory could also act as a disincentive for a 
defendant to voluntarily change conduct, whether legal or not, because of “the possibility of being 
assessed attorney’s fees.” Id. 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia refuted the dissent’s policy concerns: 
The dissent’s ultimate worry is that today’s opinion will “impede access to court for the 
less well-heeled[.]” But, of course, the catalyst theory also harms the “less well-heeled,” 
putting pressure on them to avoid the risk of massive fees by abandoning a solidly 
defensible case early in litigation. Since the fee-shifting statutes at issue here allow 
defendants as well as plaintiffs to receive a fee award, we know that Congress did not 
intend to maximize the quantity of “the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys 
general[.]” Rather, Congress desired an appropriate level of enforcement—which is more 
likely to be produced by limiting fee awards to plaintiffs who prevail “on the merits,” or 
at least to those who achieve an enforceable “alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties,” than by permitting the open-ended inquiry approved by the dissent. 
Id. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal cross-references omitted). 
 101. Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). 
 102. Id. at 610 (quoting Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)). 
 103. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992); see supra note 71. 
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relationship”104 must have sufficient “judicial imprimatur”105 to qualify 
a party as prevailing in the suit.106 To clarify the concept of imprimatur, 
the Court explained in a footnote that any resolution of a suit that lacks 
sufficient judicial approval and oversight107 would not suffice for 
prevailing party status.108 By referring to both approval and oversight in 
its endorsement of consent decrees, the Court implied that to sustain 
prevailing party status a private agreement must contain both an element 
of enforceability and some level of judicial approval of the terms of the 
settlement.109 The issue of judicial approval closely tracks the Court’s 
concern regarding the “merit requirement”—in other words, a party 
 104. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)). 
 105. Id. at 605 (emphasis added). Courts following Buckhannon have recognized that “the 
core of the Court’s reasoning was the concept of ‘judicial imprimatur.’” Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 
358 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 106. The dissent emphasized that, “in determining whether fee-shifting is in order, the Court 
in the past has placed greatest weight not on any ‘judicial imprimatur,’ but on the practical impact of 
the lawsuit.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, a plaintiff prevails when 
he has achieved what he sought in bringing the suit in the first place, whether or not the success is 
court-ordered. Id. at 642–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). To this, Justice Scalia in his concurrence 
responded, 
[M]any statutes . . . use the phrase [“prevailing party”] in a context that presumes the 
existence of a judicial ruling. . . . When “prevailing party” is used by courts or 
legislatures in the context of a lawsuit, it is a term of art. It has traditionally—and to my 
knowledge, prior to enactment of the first of the statutes at issue here, invariably—meant 
the party that wins the suit or obtains a finding (or an admission) of liability. 
Id. at 614–15 (Scalia, J., concurring). Therefore, a party does not prevail if the success achieved does 
not bear some judicial imprimatur. 
 107. Id. at 604 n.7. 
 108. The Court also notes in footnote seven that “federal jurisdiction to enforce a private 
contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into 
the order of dismissal.” Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 
(1994)). Kokkonen stands for the proposition that federal district courts do not possess inherent 
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce breach of contract claims when one party has violated a private 
settlement agreement. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (“No case of ours asserts, nor do we think the 
concept of limited federal jurisdiction permits us to assert, ancillary jurisdiction over any agreement 
that has as part of its consideration the dismissal of a case before a federal court.”). The Court in 
Kokkonen did recognize, however, that federal district courts may retain jurisdiction to enforce a 
settlement agreement when “the settlement agreement [has] been made part of the order of 
dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the 
settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.” Id. at 
381. 
 109. Inclusion of these two elements satisfies the Garland requirement that a prevailing party 
obtain a change in the legal relationship. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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prevails only if he receives judicial relief on some merit of his claim.110 
Judicial approval of a settlement necessarily implicates a review of the 
suit’s underlying merits. Hence, a judge’s fairness review in the consent 
decree context includes some degree of inquiry into the strength of the 
plaintiff’s claims.111 This inquiry into the merits suggests that the 
Court’s reference to approval is merely a gloss on the previously 
elaborated merit requirement.  
But this endorsement of imprimatur begs the question as to exactly 
how much judicial approval and oversight are needed before a settlement 
agreement can serve as a proper basis for prevailing party status. Can a 
settlement agreement with sufficient judicial imprimatur be the 
functional equivalent of a consent decree and hence serve as the basis for 
prevailing party status?112 On the continuum between consent decrees 
and purely private settlements,113 there is a line representing the point at 
which a party obtains a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal 
relationship of the parties”114 and “crosse[s] the ‘statutory threshold’ of 
 110. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606. The Fourth Circuit recognized that “[g]enerally, the 
Supreme Court has stated, “a determination of ‘legal merit’ is necessary for an award of attorney’s 
fees.” Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606). 
 111. See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that a 
valid consent decree “requires a determination that the proposal represents a reasonable factual and 
legal determination based on the facts of record, whether established by evidence, affidavit, or 
stipulation”). 
 112. Many circuit courts considering this question have answered it in the affirmative. See, 
e.g., Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281 (“[A]n order containing an agreement reached by the parties may be 
functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not 
entitled as such.”); infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
Smyth recognized, however, that “approval and oversight of an agreement alone will not 
suffice to make a party a prevailing party. The party must likewise demonstrate that it has received 
some of the relief it sought in bringing the lawsuit in the first place.” Id. at 282 n.11. In Smyth, the 
settlement achieved by the plaintiffs was “insufficient to support prevailing party status” because 
“[a]n agreement that the plaintiff will join a motion to dismiss a lawsuit in return for the defendant’s 
promise not to seek sanctions against the plaintiff . . . [did] not render the plaintiff a prevailing party 
even if incorporated into an enforceable court order.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. The term “purely private settlements” does not appear in the text of Buckhannon. It is 
used, however, by Judge Melloy in his dissenting opinion to Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 
990 (8th Cir. 2003), as distinguishable from “a settlement agreement with retained enforcement 
jurisdiction, or a consent decree.” Id. at 996 (Melloy, J., dissenting). As used in this Comment, the 
term “purely private settlement” will denote a private settlement that is not incorporated into a court 
order dismissing a case. 
 114.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; see also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. 
Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Finding a common 
thread in its precedent, the Court in effect established a line: a party prevails only upon obtaining a 
‘judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.’” (citation omitted)). 
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prevailing party status.”115 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this 
continuum when it declared, “the ‘catalyst theory’ falls on the other side 
of the line from [judgments on the merits and consent decrees].”116  
Consent decrees fall on the “sufficient-judicial-imprimatur” side of 
the line because they “involve[] judicial approval and oversight that may 
suffice to demonstrate the requisite ‘court-ordered chang[e] [in] the legal 
relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.’”117 On the 
contrary, “[p]rivate settlements do not entail the judicial approval and 
oversight”118 necessary for a determination that a party has prevailed on 
the merits. Thus, purely private settlements fall on the other side of the 
line from consent decrees when courts determine prevailing party status. 
Unfortunately, the Court in Buckhannon did not answer the question of 
how much judicial imprimatur of the change is needed before a private 
settlement crosses over to the “prevailing party” side of the line. This 
unanswered question has subsequently spawned disagreement among the 
various circuit courts as to where to draw the line.119
IV. THE AFTERMATH: CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS  
OF BUCKHANNON 
In the absence of clear policy guidelines from the Supreme Court, 
the circuit courts looked to the examples enumerated by the Court as 
guideposts to determine what is sufficient judicial imprimatur.120 Circuit 
courts have split on the question of how much judicial approval and 
oversight is sufficient, or even whether judicial approval and oversight 
can ever make a private agreement sufficiently equivalent to a consent 
decree such that it supports prevailing party status.121 This Part explores 
 115. Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989). 
 116. Id. at 605. 
 117. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606). 
 118. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7. 
 119. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 120. According to the Court in footnote seven, consent decrees have enough judicial 
imprimatur while private settlements do not. See supra note 108. 
 121. See infra Parts IV.C and V.B. One commentator has stated: 
While courts have been surprisingly uniform in finding that Buckhannon invalidates the 
catalyst theory in “prevailing party” statutes, they have been far less unanimous in 
defining these very fact-specific cases that circumvent Buckhannon. Unfortunately, the 
wide variety of judicial actions involved in these cases suggests that a second generation 
of post-Buckhannon litigation may be arising to ascertain the precise types of judicial 
action needed to constitute a true change in legal relationship as required by Buckhannon. 
Silecchia, supra note 28, at 51. 
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decisions issued by the Ninth, Eight, and Third Circuits to illustrate these 
differing approaches.  
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach in Barrios 
The Ninth Circuit first considered Buckhannon in Barrios v. 
California Interscholastic Federation.122 In Barrios, the plaintiff, a 
paraplegic high school baseball coach, filed a complaint and application 
for a temporary restraining order to allow him to remain on the field to 
coach his team during games.123 The parties subsequently reached a 
settlement agreement, but Barrios’s petition for attorney’s fees was 
denied by the district court.124 The parties then “stipulated to a dismissal 
with prejudice,” which made “no mention of the issue of attorneys’ 
fees.”125 Subsequent to the district court’s decision but prior to the Ninth 
Circuit hearing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court issued the 
Buckhannon ruling.  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Barrios was a prevailing party 
and that Buckhannon did not control the outcome of the case.126 The 
court read Buckhannon narrowly as applying only to parties acting as a 
catalyst of policy change.127 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that even 
though the catalyst theory was no longer valid for conferring prevailing 
party status following Buckhannon,128 Barrios was a prevailing party 
because he obtained a legally enforceable settlement agreement.129 The 
 122. 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 123. Id. at 1130–32. 
 124. On the issue of attorney’s fees, the district court held that Barrios was indeed a 
“prevailing party” under the ADA. Id. at 1134. However, the district court ruled that “Barrios’ 
victory was at best de minimis and thus undeserving of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. 
 125. Id. at 1133. The settlement agreement provided, among other things, that “the issue of 
whether any [party] is the prevailing party and whether any [party] is entitled to attorneys’ fees, and 
if so, the amount thereof, is expressly reserved for the Court to decide upon motion by any [party].” 
Id. 
The district court initially “entered a judgment and order according to the terms of the 
settlement agreement,” but that order was subsequently vacated upon motion by the defendant 
California Interscholastic Federation, because, as Barrios conceded, “the settlement did not address 
whether a judgment or stipulation for dismissal would be filed.” Id. 
 126. Id. at 1134 n.5. 
 127. Id. Specifically, the court declared: “Barrios, however, does not claim to be a ‘prevailing 
party’ simply by virtue of his being a catalyst of policy change; rather, his settlement agreement 
affords him a legally enforceable instrument, which under Fischer, makes him a ‘prevailing party.’” 
Id. (citing Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 128. Id. (citing Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 129. Id.; see supra note 127. 
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Ninth Circuit avoided dealing with the Supreme Court’s language 
regarding the insufficiency of private settlements by characterizing 
Buckhannon’s footnote seven as “dictum [which merely] suggests that a 
plaintiff ‘prevails’ only when he or she receives a favorable judgment on 
the merits or enters into a court-supervised consent decree.”130
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach in Bloomberg 
The Eighth Circuit considered the question of judicial imprimatur for 
“prevailing party” status in Christina A. v. Bloomberg.131 In the context 
of a proposed class action settlement agreement,132 the district court in 
Bloomberg conducted a “‘fairness hearing’ pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(e),” approved the agreement,133 and specifically 
“retain[ed] jurisdiction for the ‘purpose of enforcing the Settlement 
Agreement.’”134 The district court then awarded attorney’s fees to the 
plaintiff class as prevailing parties.135
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the award of attorney’s fees 
by focusing its inquiry on the settlement agreement’s form rather than 
the level of judicial imprimatur: 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. 315 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 132. Id. at 991. The Bloomberg plaintiffs, juvenile inmates at the South Dakota State Training 
School, sued as a class to effectuate changes in school policies and treatment of them as inmates: 
At issue, among other things, were (1) the restraint methods used by the institution’s 
employees, (2) the lengthy confinements to which inmates were subjected, (3) the 
provision (or lack thereof) of mental health services, (4) the training of staff, (5) the 
“arbitrary” method of discipline and punishment, (6) the presence of male staff members 
in the female shower area, (7) the monitoring of telephone calls and visits, and (8) the 
lack of special education courses for inmates who need additional educational assistance. 
Id. 
 133. While the district court did conduct a fairness review pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), it 
did not incorporate any of the “specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties in its 
opinion and order.” Id. 
 134. Id. Class action settlements must receive the “approval of the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e). The “universally applied standard” for a court’s approval “is whether the settlement is 
fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. Some courts also require that settlements be consistent 
with the public interest. Finally, the court must determine that the terms of the settlement do not 
violate any applicable federal law.” 5 MOORE, supra note 44, § 23.85[1] (compiling cases and listing 
various multi-factor tests that various courts apply). A court’s involvement in a class action 
settlement may include granting preliminary approval of the settlement, conducting a fairness 
hearing prior to final approval, considering class members’ objections, and making specific findings 
and conclusions regarding the fairness of an approved settlement. See id. §§ 23.85[3]–[8]. 
 135. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 991. 
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The Supreme Court specified that a judgment on the merits or a 
“settlement agreement[] enforced through a consent decree” is 
sufficient to meet this standard. . . . If the agreement between the 
inmate class and the institution is a private settlement, then it is clear 
from Buckhannon that the inmate class is not a “prevailing party” 
entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.136
The Eighth Circuit thus viewed the question as a matter of 
classification—in other words, if the settlement is a private settlement 
then there is not sufficient judicial imprimatur, and if the settlement is a 
consent decree then there is sufficient imprimatur. The court stated the 
Buckhannon rule as such: “a party prevails only if it receives either an 
enforceable judgment on the merits or a consent decree.”137 The court 
apparently viewed those two options as comprising the exhaustive list of 
judicial relief that may convey prevailing party status. The line is simply 
drawn right behind consent decrees, and no amount of judicial 
imprimatur on a private settlement will suffice to convey prevailing party 
status.138 In reaching this conclusion, the Bloomberg court reasoned that 
a settlement, even in the class action context, was not the functional 
equivalent of a consent decree because it is not directly enforceable 
through the court’s contempt power.139
 136. Id. at 992 (citations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 993 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). 
 138. The circuit court in Bloomberg explicitly rejected the district court’s pronouncement that 
the class action settlement at issue was the functional equivalent of a consent decree and hence a fee 
award was justified: 
The district court indicated that, although the settlement agreement was not a formal 
consent decree, “to read Buckhannon to require one particular form for resolving a 
dispute in order to become a prevailing party is to read the opinion too narrowly.” 
Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (D.S.D. 2001). The court went on 
to say that the settlement agreement served essentially the same purpose as a formal 
consent decree since it changed the legal relationship between the parties by requiring the 
appellants to make specific improvements to the training school and by allowing the 
appellees to enforce the agreement in court. Id. at 1099. We disagree with this 
conclusion. 
Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 993. In fact, in a footnote, the circuit court recast the district court’s holding 
to conform to its conception of the proper analytical framework. Id. at 993 n.3 (“We do not read the 
district court’s opinion as holding that an agreement that falls short of the essential requirements of a 
consent decree is sufficient. We believe that the court finds that the approved agreement is, indeed, 
some form of consent decree.”) (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. at 994 (“[T]he availability of . . . non-contempt remedies fails to support the 
conclusion that the settlement agreement serves essentially as a consent decree.”). 
3TEN-FIN 8/9/2005 2:32:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
452 
 
C. The Third Circuit’s Approach to Judicial Imprimatur 
Subsequent to Buckhannon, the Third Circuit considered what extent 
of judicial imprimatur was needed for a litigant to be a prevailing party 
under a private settlement in Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing 
Authority.140 In Truesdell, the plaintiff, participating in a Section 8 
Federal Housing Assistance Program administered by the Philadelphia 
Housing Authority (“PHA”), brought a § 1983 action to enforce his 
rights under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937.141 The terms of the 
subsequent settlement requiring the PHA to undertake certain actions 
were included in the district court’s order. These actions included a 
retroactive rent adjustment that the PHA had previously refused to grant 
to the plaintiff.142 However, the district court denied Truesdell’s motions 
for attorney’s fees.143
On appeal, the PHA argued that “because it never admitted liability 
nor consented to what counsel termed in oral argument a ‘gratuitous 
resolution,’ the [dismissal order] was a stipulated settlement—not a court 
approved consent decree—and therefore no attorney’s fees should be 
awarded.”144 To resolve the issue, the Truesdell court discussed whether 
the judicial order, “in form, may support an award of attorney’s fees.”145  
The Third Circuit recognized that since “attorney’s fees may be 
awarded based on a settlement when it is enforced through a consent 
decree,”146 a judicial order that was enough like a consent decree may be 
sufficient to warrant a fee award.147 The court reasoned that if the private 
settlement is enforceable against the opposing party through a court 
order, even though not titled “Consent Decree,” then the party in whose 
favor that order is entered may be termed the prevailing party.148 The 
Truesdell court found the judicial order enforcing the private settlement 
sufficient to confer prevailing party status based on the following 
 140. 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 141. Id. at 161. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 163. 
 144. Id. at 164–65. 
 145. Id. at 165. 
 146. Id. (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). 
 147. Cf. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n order containing an 
agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry to 
which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”). 
 148. Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 165. 
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characteristics: (1) the order contained “mandatory language” requiring 
the PHA to take certain actions inuring to the benefit of the plaintiff,149 
(2) the document was entitled “Order,” (3) the document bore “the 
signature of the district court judge, not the parties’ counsel,” and (4) the 
document “gave Truesdell the right to request judicial enforcement of the 
settlement against PHA.”150 In a subsequent case, the court explained 
that compliance with these four factors is enough for a stipulated 
settlement to be sufficiently “judicially sanctioned”151 for prevailing 
party purposes. 
The Third Circuit’s approach falls between the Ninth and Eighth 
Circuits in terms of the level of judicial imprimatur required for 
prevailing party status. The approaches of these three circuits illustrate 
how circuit courts following Buckhannon have diverged on the question 
of who can be a prevailing party. A majority of circuits have agreed with 
the Third Circuit in holding that a party may be deemed “prevailing” 
after having obtained a private settlement with sufficient judicial 
imprimatur,152 but other circuits have disagreed, either adopting a 
 149. At least one other circuit court has found the presence of mandatory language in a district 
court’s dismissal order determinative. See New England Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 
F.3d 9, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The district court did not compel [the defendant] to adopt the 
regulations. Under the Buckhannon rule, that ends the matter.”). 
 150. Truesdell, 290 F.3d. at 165. Regarding the importance of the enforceability, the court 
cites Farrar for its holding that “[n]o material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties 
occurs until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement 
against the defendant.” Id. (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992)). 
 151. John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 152. E.g., Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We therefore join the 
majority of courts to have considered the issue since Buckhannon in concluding that judicial action 
other than a judgment on the merits or a consent decree can support an award of attorney’s fees, so 
long as such action carries with it sufficient judicial imprimatur.”); T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 
102, 349 F.3d 469, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that some private settlements entail 
sufficient judicial approval and oversight to serve as the basis of an award for attorney’s fees); 
Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We will assume, then, that an order containing 
an agreement reached by the parties may be functionally a consent decree for purposes of the inquiry 
to which Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.”); Am. Disability Ass’n v. Chmielarz, 
289 F.3d 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); see also Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 24 n.4, 
30 (1st Cir. 2004) (taking “no position on whether forms of judicial imprimatur other than a 
judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree may suffice to ground an award of 
attorneys’ fees,” but recognizing that other circuits have considered the question and implying that 
“plaintiffs who achieve their desired result via private settlement may . . . be considered ‘prevailing 
parties’” with sufficient judicial imprimatur).  
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narrow view of what constitutes a prevailing party153 or an overly 
permissive view of prevailing party.154
V. ANALYSIS 
A court should award prevailing party status only when a party’s 
settlement has sufficient judicial imprimatur under the Buckhannon 
requirements of approval and oversight. In this regard, the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach is overly broad and fails to follow the rule set forth in 
Buckhannon. On the other hand, courts should respect Congress’s intent 
to encourage private suits to enforce important public policies. 
Accordingly, courts should allow fee shifting to prevailing parties with 
less than a judgment on the merits or a consent decree, provided the 
 153. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Buckhannon, as 
indicated, makes it clear that a party prevails only if it receives either an enforceable judgment on the 
merits or a consent decree.”); see also Toms v. Taft, 338 F.3d 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The 
Supreme Court has limited the term ‘prevailing party’ to a party who obtains either a judgment on 
the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”) (citation omitted); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 
Int’l Union v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“We therefore hold that in 
order for plaintiffs in FOIA actions to become eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees, they must 
have ‘been awarded some relief by [a] court,’ either in a judgment on the merits or in a court-ordered 
consent decree.”); infra Part IV.C. 
There is some question as to whether the D.C. Circuit in Atomic Workers actually held that 
nothing outside of a judgment on the merits or a consent decree suffices for prevailing party status. 
The dissent in Atomic Workers characterizes the majority holding in that regard as merely a 
“suggestion.” 288 F.3d at 459 (Rogers, J., dissenting). And the Second Circuit in Roberson includes 
the D.C. Circuit as among the circuits that have concluded that “judicial action other than a judgment 
on the merits or a consent decree can support an award of attorney’s fees, so long as such action 
carries with it sufficient judicial imprimatur.” 346 F.3d at 81. The Roberson court characterizes 
Atomic Workers as “implying that had there been [an alteration in the legal relationship of the 
parties], Buckhannon would not preclude an award of fees.” Id. (citing Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d 
452, 458–59). The inquiry in Atomic Workers concerned whether the stipulation and orders in the 
case were in fact consent decrees and was not to determine whether there was sufficient judicial 
imprimatur. Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 458–59. There is a noted lack of recognition by the 
majority in Atomic Workers that something other than a consent decree may be the functional 
equivalent of a consent decree.  
Additionally, the dissent in Atomic Workers based its argument on the assumption that the 
majority was focusing solely on “whether the relief obtained was either a judgment on the merits or 
a consent decree” when it should have instead “looked for action compelled by the court, focusing 
on the underlying concern of the Supreme Court in Buckhannon that there be some ‘judicial 
imprimatur on the change’ in the parties’ legal status.” Id. at 462 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). This Comment, therefore, includes the D.C. Circuit, together with the Eighth and Sixth 
Circuits, as adopting a narrow reading of Buckhannon. See infra Part IV.B. 
 154. See Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(distinguishing Buckhannon based on the fact that the plaintiffs in Buckhannon were “a catalyst of 
policy change” whereas the Barrios plaintiff had a “legally enforceable instrument” in his settlement 
agreement); infra Part IV.A. 
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parties’ settlement contains sufficient imprimatur. In this regard, the 
Eighth Circuit’s approach is overly restrictive. The Third Circuit’s 
approach comes closest to satisfying the Court’s imprimatur concerns; 
however, it should be augmented to include an explicit merit-review 
requirement. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach Is Overly Broad 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach to determining “prevailing party” 
status runs counter to Supreme Court precedent. Because a judge does 
not inquire into whether a party has succeeded on any merits in the 
typical stipulated dismissal context,155 such a resolution does not warrant 
an award of attorney’s fees. Had the Ninth Circuit appropriately followed 
the reasoning of Buckhannon, it would have concluded that Barrios was 
not a prevailing party because he secured a private settlement agreement 
and nothing more. The judicial order dismissing the case did not require 
the parties to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement, nor did 
it retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement.156
In Barrios, the Ninth Circuit improperly expanded the class of 
“prevailing party” further than any circuit court interpreting Buckhannon. 
The court reasoned that because Barrios could “enforce the terms of the 
settlement agreement against the [defendant] . . . Barrios was the 
‘prevailing party’ in his civil rights litigation.”157 In so holding, the 
Ninth Circuit felt it proper to follow its own prevailing party 
precedent158 rather than clear Supreme Court language in Buckhannon. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has a rule that “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when he or 
 155. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 156. The Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the court’s order is a stipulated dismissal with 
prejudice. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1133. 
 157. Id. at 1134. 
 158. The Ninth Circuit had previously held:  
“[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the 
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way 
that directly benefits the plaintiff.” The Court explained that “a material alteration of the 
legal relationship occurs [when] the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, 
consent decree, or settlement against the defendant.” In these situations, the legal 
relationship is altered because the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something he 
otherwise would not have to do. 
Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 
103, 111–12 (1992)). 
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she enters into a legally enforceable settlement agreement against the 
defendant.”159
The Ninth Circuit in Barrios ignored the clear implications of the 
entire Buckhannon decision. It did this by characterizing the footnote 
seven “approval and oversight” language in Buckhannon as dictum—
technically correct in that Buckhannon did not involve a settlement 
agreement—which it was not bound to follow. However, this 
construction of footnote seven’s language ignores the context in which it 
is found.160 Footnote seven’s reference to “approval and oversight” 
appears in the midst of the Court’s explication of the requirements for 
prevailing party status.  
The Court in Buckhannon clearly held that a “‘prevailing party’ is 
one who has been awarded some relief by the court.”161 It also stated that 
a party only prevails when there is sufficient “judicial imprimatur” and 
“judicial[] sanction[]” in the “change in the legal relationship of the 
parties.”162 The Court distilled its “merit requirement” from prior 
precedent—a requirement that is clearly not met in Barrios as the only 
judicial involvement in the suit was through a stipulated dismissal order 
without any approval or retained jurisdiction over the settlement terms. 
By awarding prevailing party status to the plaintiff in Barrios, the Ninth 
Circuit ignored the Buckhannon requirements that the change in the 
parties’ relationship be court-ordered and that the prevailing party have 
“established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his 
claims.”163
In Barrios, the parties’ settlement expressly reserved the question of 
prevailing party status and attorney’s fees for the court to determine.164 
The court in Barrios held that the private settlement agreement’s deferral 
to the court to determine the question of attorney’s fees provided 
 159. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed its Barrios holding. 
See Richard S. v. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 317 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 160. See infra notes 170–171 and accompanying text; see also Mark C. Weber, Litigation 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. 
v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 389–90 (2004) 
(“By ignoring the requirement for a judicial sanction in the settlement it said would support fees, the 
Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Supreme Court’s reasoning, and its distinction of the case is not 
fully persuasive.”). 
 161. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 603 (2001). 
 162. Id. at 605. 
 163. Id. at 604 (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980)). 
 164. See supra note 125. 
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“sufficient judicial oversight to justify an award of attorneys’ fees and 
costs.”165 This reasoning runs counter to Buckhannon’s holding that a 
party only prevails when the change in the legal relationship is “court-
ordered.”166 Also, the merit requirement is not met because the trial 
judge in Barrios undertook no review of the underlying claim’s 
merits.167 Nothing in the private settlement agreement conferred 
continuing “federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual 
settlement.”168 It is safe to say that the dismissal order at issue in Barrios 
did not convey the necessary judicial sanction to change the parties’ 
relationship. Such “is not the stuff of which legal victories are made.”169
Circuit courts that have considered the Barrios reasoning have 
rejected its take on Buckhannon. For example, the Third Circuit 
characterized Barrios as “distinguish[ing] Buckhannon on very narrow 
grounds.”170 Similarly, the First Circuit viewed “[t]he Barrios court’s 
reading of Buckhannon [as] contraven[ing] the Supreme Court’s 
unambiguous rejection of private settlement as sufficient grounds for 
‘prevailing party’ status.”171 The Ninth Circuit improperly held in 
Barrios that a plaintiff could be a prevailing party with nothing more 
than a private settlement. 
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach Is Overly Narrow and Restrictive 
1. Form over substance 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Bloomberg adopts a narrow and overly restrictive approach, 
focusing too much on the form of the judicial order as determinative of 
whether a party has prevailed. The Eighth Circuit viewed Buckhannon as 
“mak[ing] it clear that a party prevails only if it receives either an 
enforceable judgment on the merits or a consent decree.”172 On appeal, 
the Eighth Circuit’s elevation of form over substance resulted from its 
 165. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, at 1134 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 166. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. 
 167. See Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1133. 
 168. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7. 
 169. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987). 
 170. John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 171. Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2004); see also N.Y. State Fed’n of 
Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 272 F.3d 154, 158–59 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 172. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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disregard of the judicial approval and oversight173 involved in the case. 
In Bloomberg, the district court in a class action settlement context had 
approved the terms of the proposed settlement for fairness.174 The court 
disregarded the approval element and improperly reasoned away the 
oversight element. 
On the question of the district court’s approval of the settlement 
terms, the Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded as to its effect for prevailing 
party determination: “Although Rule 23(e) requires the district court to 
approve the class action agreement, it does not require the court to 
establish the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the district court’s 
approval of the settlement agreement does not, by itself, create a consent 
decree . . . .”175 In making this assertion, the court impliedly presupposed 
that in consent decree situations the court, rather than the parties, 
“establish[es] the terms” of the agreement.176 This supposition has no 
basis in reality, as the parties themselves are the ones that establish the 
terms of a consent decree and then submit those terms for judicial 
approval.177  
For Buckhannon prevailing party purposes, class action settlement 
agreements entail the same level of judicial approval as consent 
decrees.178 Misunderstanding the sufficiency of a court’s approval in the 
class action settlement, the Eighth Circuit failed to address the fact that 
the district court’s “fairness review” for the purposes of Rule 23(e) 
should have entailed sufficient judicial approval for “prevailing party” 
status. 
The Eighth Circuit also misunderstood the sufficiency of the district 
court’s oversight in retaining jurisdiction over the settlement. In a 
footnote the court stated, “the district court purported to retain 
jurisdiction over the agreement in order to enforce its provisions against 
appellants.”179 The court apparently believed that the district court did 
 173. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7. 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
 175. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 992–93.  
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 178. Compare supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting that judges review consent 
decrees to determine whether they are “fair, adequate, and reasonable”) with 5 MOORE, supra note 
44, § 23.85[1].
 179. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 994 n.5 (emphasis added). The distinction between the class 
action settlement and the consent decree settlement is negligible when determining prevailing party 
status. While it is true that the parties to a consent decree specifically intend their agreement to be 
memorialized in a judicial decree and that class action parties may not wish for such incorporation, 
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not have jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, 
either through its inherent jurisdiction to enforce its own orders or 
through incorporating the terms of the agreement into the dismissal 
order. But the court failed to explain why the explicit retention of 
jurisdiction was not sufficient. The court reasoned that because the 
plaintiffs could only enforce the class action settlement through a breach 
of contract action, they were not prevailing parties under a Buckhannon 
analysis.180 The court ignored the reality that the district court’s retained 
jurisdiction allowed for enforcement of the settlement terms.181
In fact, both Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent call for the 
opposite result on the enforcement issue. The Court in Kokkonen 
explicitly recognized that a district court may retain jurisdiction over a 
dismissed settlement agreement through either incorporation of the terms 
in a dismissal order or through a specific “retaining jurisdiction” 
provision in the dismissal order.182 Commentators have reached similar 
conclusions.183 Even the Eighth Circuit “has repeatedly recognized the 
possibility of federal enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement 
in both contexts the court must examine the terms for fairness and retain jurisdiction to enforce the 
terms of the settlement. The judge is also required in both contexts to ensure fairness of the 
agreement before signing off on it. However, at least one court has described the level of scrutiny in 
the consent decree context as “more careful” than that in the class action settlement context. United 
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 34–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 993 (“[C]onsent decrees . . . are enforceable through the 
supervising court’s exercise of its contempt powers, and private settlements [are] enforceable only 
through a new action for breach of contract.”) (quoting Hazen ex rel. LeGear v. Reagen, 208 F.3d 
697, 699 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
 181. A court may enforce a consent decree directly through contempt power. With an 
incorporated settlement, a court may also enforce the terms through the contempt power, albeit 
through a circuitous route. See infra note 200. 
 182. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (recognizing that a 
settlement agreement may be “made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision 
(such as a provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the 
terms of the settlement agreement in the order”). 
 183. Although “district courts have no inherent power to enforce settlement agreements” in the 
class action context, “[i]t is common in class actions for courts to explicitly retain jurisdiction over 
settlement agreements and to incorporate the terms of such agreements in dismissal orders.” 5 
MOORE, supra note 44, § 23.87. Moore further recognizes that class action settlements are akin to 
consent decrees: 
A class action settlement, like an agreement resolving any other legal claim, is a private 
contract negotiated between the parties. Nevertheless, Rule 23(e) requires the court to 
intrude on that private consensual agreement to ensure that the agreement is not the 
product of fraud or collusion and that, taken as a whole, it is fair, adequate, and 
reasonable to all concerned. 
Id. § 23.82[1]. 
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agreement where the district court approves, and expressly retains 
jurisdiction to enforce, the agreement.”184
Instead of explaining why the district court’s retention of jurisdiction 
was not sufficient, the Bloomberg majority focused on general principles 
of dismissal that had no apparent connection to the facts of the case. The 
court cited to Moore’s Federal Practice for the proposition that “a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) [as here] 
renders the proceedings a nullity and leaves the parties as if the action 
had never been brought.”185 But in this particular case, the parties have 
something more than they had before the action was brought—a 
settlement reviewed by the judge and enforceable through the court’s 
retained jurisdiction. The Bloomberg plaintiffs presented a strong case 
for prevailing party status—the party obtained a dismissal short of a 
consent decree, which nevertheless contained sufficient judicial approval 
and oversight to justify prevailing party status.186
2. The Roberson reasoning undermines the logic of Bloomberg 
The Second Circuit in Roberson adopted a view opposite that of the 
Eighth Circuit regarding the importance of the enforcement remedy in 
determining prevailing party status.187 The Roberson district court 
adopted the same reasoning regarding the distinction between settlements 
and consent decrees as did the Eighth Circuit in Bloomberg.188 In 
rejecting the district court’s arguments, the Second Circuit presented 
reasoning that effectively refutes the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in 
Bloomberg. 
In Roberson, although the district court had incorporated the 
settlement terms into the dismissal order and specifically retained 
 184. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 997 (Melloy, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Hayden Ass’n, v. ATY 
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 289 F.3d 530, 532–33 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen for the proposition that a 
settlement agreement may be made part of a district court’s order of dismissal by a provision 
retaining jurisdiction over a settlement agreement); Gilbert v. Monsanto, 216 F.3d 695, 699–700 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (same)). 
 185. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 993–94 (citing 8 MOORE, supra note 44, § 41.40[9][b]). 
 186. See infra Part V.D.1. 
 187. Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 188. Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 10900 (DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *8–9 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002) (“Here, there is neither an enforceable judgment on the merits nor a court-
ordered consent decree. . . . The Court's continuing jurisdiction in order to enforce the terms of the 
Agreement does not, however, constitute a ‘judicial sanctioning’ of the alteration of their legal 
relationship such that the plaintiffs can be considered prevailing parties under the Buckhannon 
standard.”). 
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jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, it ruled that 
“[t]he [c]ourt’s continuing jurisdiction in order to enforce the terms of 
the Agreement does not . . . constitute a ‘judicial sanctioning’ of the 
alteration of their legal relationship such that the plaintiffs can be 
considered prevailing parties under the Buckhannon standard.”189 The 
district court distinguished the settlement at issue from consent decrees 
on three grounds: first, the level of judicial scrutiny involved;190 second, 
the court’s inherent power to enforce a consent decree;191 and third, the 
fact that consent decrees are “directly enforceable through the contempt 
power of the court.”192 The first element corresponds to Buckhannon’s 
approval element while the second and third correspond to the oversight 
element.  
On appeal, the Second Circuit found the district court’s enumerated 
distinctions to be insignificant for purposes of a prevailing party 
inquiry.193 On the first point, the circuit court reasoned that “because the 
court has the general responsibility to ensure that its orders are fair and 
lawful, it retains some responsibility over the terms of a settlement 
 189. Id. at *3. 
 190. Id. (“Although it may be minimal, there is a level of judicial scrutiny of the terms of a 
consent decree that is entirely absent when a lawsuit is dismissed based on the parties’ agreement to 
settle it.”). 
 191. Id. On this point, the district court correctly cites the Kokkonen principle, but seems to 
either misconstrue its applicability to the agreement at hand or to ignore it entirely. Specifically, the 
district court declared that 
[w]here . . . “‘the parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement 
had been made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a 
provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the 
terms of the settlement agreement in the order”—a federal court retains jurisdiction to 
enforce the settlement agreement. 
Id. at *13 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994)). The 
district court’s opinion is silent as to why the “retaining jurisdiction” provision in the instant case 
was not sufficient judicial oversight for prevailing party status. 
 192. Roberson, 346 F.3d at 80. The district court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 160 F.3d 911, 916–17 (2d Cir. 1998), for the proposition 
that “because the district court lacked authority to condition the dismissal on compliance with the 
settlement agreement, it lacked a basis for finding contempt.” Roberson, No. 99 Civ. (DLC), 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *15–16. The Second Circuit responded that its Hester decision  
did not offer an opinion on how an explicit retention of jurisdiction would have changed 
the outcome of the case, if at all. It is therefore an open question in this circuit whether a 
district court could enforce an agreement through its contempt power in circumstances 
like those facing us in this appeal. 
 Roberson, 346 F.3d at 83 n.9. 
 193. Roberson, 346 F.3d at 83. 
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agreement.”194 Accordingly, when the court incorporates or references 
the terms of the settlement into its dismissal order, there will be at least 
the same “minimal . . . level of judicial scrutiny”195 that the district court 
reasoned was sufficient in the consent decree context.196
The next two points raised dealt with the difference between 
incorporated settlements and consent decrees in terms of the enforcement 
remedy. The Eighth Circuit in Bloomberg had used this distinction as the 
principal reason for holding that a settlement could not serve as the basis 
for prevailing party status.197 On the second point, the Second Circuit 
found it insignificant that the district court’s jurisdiction over a consent 
decree is inherent while its jurisdiction over an incorporated settlement 
only stems from its inclusion in a court order.198 Regarding the third 
point, the court explained that the fact that the contempt power is 
inherent in a consent decree and not in a stipulated settlement is not 
“significant enough to deprive plaintiffs of prevailing party status.”199 
The court reasoned that “[i]n the case of both consent decrees and private 
settlement agreements over which a district court retains enforcement 
jurisdiction, the district court has the authority to force compliance with 
the terms agreed upon by the parties.”200 Where Bloomberg found the 
lack of a direct contempt remedy in the incorporated settlement context 
dispositive, the Second Circuit correctly recognized that this argument 
was unsound. 
 194. Id. at 82. 
 195. Roberson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, at *9. 
 196. However, this minimal level of judicial scrutiny may not be enough to satisfy the 
Supreme Court’s concern’s regarding the level of judicial imprimatur required for prevailing party 
status. This Comment suggests that more is required. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 197. See supra notes 179–181 and accompanying text. 
 198. The court stated: 
Consent decrees are enforceable in federal court because they are orders of the court; the 
Agreement is enforceable in federal court because a violation of the Agreement is a 
violation of the court’s dismissal Order. Both are, in the terms used by the Buckhannon 
Court, “court-ordered change[s] in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.” 
Roberson, 346 F.3d at 83 (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. The court recognized that in the context of enforcing a private settlement, “the court at 
most would need to take an extra step by first ordering specific performance and then, if a party does 
not comply, finding that party in contempt. We doubt that the definition of ‘prevailing party’ should 
turn on such a difference.” Id. 
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The Roberson logic effectively undermines the reasoning of 
Bloomberg.201 While there are distinctions between consent decrees and 
stipulated settlement agreements incorporated into the record, the 
Bloomberg court failed to adequately explain how those distinctions 
affect the prevailing party analysis. The Supreme Court’s focus and 
concern in Buckhannon was the level of judicial imprimatur on the 
parties’ agreement. The Eighth Circuit’s approach bears a disconnect 
from the Supreme Court’s approval and oversight concerns. The Eighth 
Circuit in Bloomberg wrongly decided that the universe of prevailing 
parties was limited only to those receiving either judgments on the merits 
or consent decrees.202
C. An Endorsement of a “Third-Circuit-Plus” Test 
While the approach of the Third Circuit comes closer to satisfying 
the Buckhannon imprimatur concerns than the approaches of the other 
circuits, it still lacks a sufficient test for judicial approval. An ideal test 
can be created by modifying the Third Circuit’s test from Truesdell to 
include a judicial approval element. Specifically, a judge should be 
required to conduct some level of review of the suit’s merits in order to 
satisfy the approval requirement. Such a test can be crafted such that it 
would simultaneously satisfy the Supreme Court’s Buckhannon concerns 
while allowing courts to expand the class of prevailing parties consistent 
with congressional intent.203
A close reading of Buckhannon reveals that a satisfactory judicial 
imprimatur test needs approval as well as oversight. The Court in 
Buckhannon was concerned that the catalyst theory “allow[ed] an award 
where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of 
the parties.”204 The Court reasoned that prevailing party status required 
that there be at least some participation by a judge—a judicial finger in 
 201. The Second Circuit approved of the “vigorous and persuasive dissent by Judge Melloy” 
in Bloomberg. Id. at 82 n.7. The court specifically referred to Judge Melloy’s pronouncement that 
“[t]he Court in Buckhannon did not limit the availability of prevailing party status to only 
those cases resolved through a consent decree or final judgment on the merits. Rather, the 
Court set forth criteria to guide the analysis of whether there is a judicially sanctioned, 
material change in the legal relationship of the parties.” 
Id. (quoting Bloomberg, 315 F.3d at 996 (Melloy, J., dissenting)). 
 202. Although joined by two other circuit courts in so holding, the Eighth Circuit is in the 
minority. See supra note 153. 
 203. See infra Part V.C.4. 
 204. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 605 (2001). 
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the pot—so as to justify the notion that the party has “prevailed” in the 
actual suit in some way.205 The Court’s reasoning suggests that the form 
of the resolution is important, but that it is not the only requirement. 
Significantly, the Court declined to “abrogate the ‘merit’ requirement of 
[its] prior cases”206 by reaffirming its declaration in Hewitt that 
“[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least 
some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to 
prevail.”207 Respect for the Court’s “merit requirement” urges that a 
judge may not simply incorporate the terms of the settlement and add his 
signature without any review of the merits of the original complaint. 
Furthermore, in Buckhannon, the Court referred to “judicial approval 
and oversight” as the distinguishing factors between consent decrees and 
private settlements.208 It follows that a party may only “prevail” when a 
judge has been sufficiently involved in the resolution of the case in both 
the areas of oversight and approval. 
1. The Third Circuit’s judicial imprimatur test satisfies judicial oversight 
The Third Circuit’s Truesdell formula adequately satisfies the 
Buckhannon concern requiring sufficient judicial oversight in a private 
settlement context.209 Specifically, the test allows a party to prevail when 
the dismissal order contains mandatory language, is entitled “Order,” is 
signed by the judge, and provides for retained jurisdiction to enforce the 
terms of the settlement agreement.210 The Supreme Court in Buckhannon 
specifically approved of consent decrees as having the requisite oversight 
for prevailing party status. This is so because courts have inherent 
jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees.211 As noted above, courts may 
retain jurisdiction over private settlements either through incorporating 
the settlement terms or through a specific provision.212 Such jurisdiction 
 205. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia points out: 
[I]n the case of court-approved settlements and consent decrees, even if there has been no 
judicial determination of the merits, the outcome is at least the product of, and bears the 
sanction of, judicial action in the lawsuit. There is at least some basis for saying that the 
party favored by the settlement or decree prevailed in the suit. 
Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 206. Id. at 606. 
 207. Id. at 603 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)). 
 208. Id. at 604 n.7. 
 209. See supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text. 
 210. Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d. 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 211. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 108. 
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over a settlement means that the court may enforce the terms of the 
settlement through its contempt power.213 By requiring that a party 
prevails only when its dismissal order contains mandatory language and 
provides for retained jurisdiction, the Third Circuit’s test provides for 
sufficient judicial oversight under Buckhannon. 
The Third Circuit’s judicial imprimatur test satisfies the oversight 
concern, while maintaining judicial flexibility to allow for an award of 
attorney’s fees even though the court-approved settlement may not be in 
the specific form of a consent decree. The Third Circuit correctly 
recognized that an agreement need not be titled “Consent Decree” to 
have sufficient judicial imprimatur. Given the many ways in which the 
parties may negotiate for a settlement and the many contexts under 
which they labor, it is not surprising that some private settlements, 
although not classified as consent decrees, will nonetheless involve a 
great deal of judicial oversight and approval. 
This test also avoids an overly restrictive formulation that 
inequitably narrows the class of parties that can recover attorney’s fees 
as prevailing parties,214 while at the same time avoiding a definition of 
“prevailing party” that is too permissive of plaintiffs who have not 
received sufficient judicial imprimatur.215 The test recognizes that there 
is a category of settlement, falling between consent decrees and purely 
private settlements on the continuum, that contains sufficient imprimatur 
to confer prevailing party status under federal fee-shifting statutes. The 
Truesdell elements satisfy the Court’s concerns regarding judicial 
oversight because they provide for continuing jurisdiction to enforce the 
settlement terms. 
2. The need for an additional merit-review element to the Third Circuit’s 
test 
While the Third Circuit’s judicial imprimatur test addresses the 
Buckhannon concern regarding oversight—in the sense of retaining 
jurisdiction—it fails to sufficiently address the judicial approval concern. 
On their face, the elements cited by the Third Circuit in Truesdell 
address a district court’s formal procedures for approving a private 
settlement. However, Buckhannon requires that a court must also review 
the terms of the settlement to determine whether a party has prevailed on 
 213. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra discussion regarding Bloomberg, Part V.B. 
 215. See supra discussion of Barrios, Part V.A. 
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the merits of the suit.216 This merit requirement also finds ample support 
in pre-Buckhannon Supreme Court precedent.217 Hence, the Third 
Circuit’s test needs a specific merit-review element in order to ensure 
sufficient judicial imprimatur for prevailing party status. 
The Truesdell elements do not require a judge to review either the 
terms of the settlement or the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claim. 
Under the Court’s Buckhannon reasoning, this is insufficient judicial 
imprimatur. The Court rejected the catalyst theory in part because it 
potentially classified a party as prevailing even when there has been no 
judicial determination of the claim’s merits.218 The Court could not 
countenance a definition of “prevailing party” that awarded “attorney’s 
fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless 
potentially meritless lawsuit (it will never be determined), has reached 
the ‘sought-after destination’ without obtaining any judicial relief.”219 
The Truesdell test, without an approval element, could likewise 
countenance an award of attorney’s fees to a party without a judge’s 
approbation of the underlying claim’s merits. Nothing in the Truesdell 
test specifically requires the judge to review and approve the specific 
terms of the settlement or determine that the party is entitled to some 
relief on the claim’s merits. 
Courts have argued that the trial judge’s “responsibility to ensure 
that its orders are fair and lawful stamps an agreement that is made part 
of an order with judicial imprimatur.”220 Under this conception, a judge 
need not undertake any specific review of the settlement terms or 
underlying merits; the court’s general mandate to ensure that its orders 
are fair suffices for judicial imprimatur.221 In Roberson, for example, the 
 216. The Supreme Court in Buckhannon stated that “[r]espect for ordinary language requires 
that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.” 
532 U.S. at 603 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)); see supra notes 52–58 and 
accompanying text. 
 217. See Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (“Respect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff 
receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.”); Hanrahan v. 
Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (“Congress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees 
only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.”); supra notes 52–58 
and accompanying text. 
 218. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606. 
 219. Id.; see supra note 90. 
 220. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 282 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 
F.3d 75, 82–83 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen the district court retained jurisdiction . . . it gave judicial 
sanction to a change in the legal relationship of the parties, regardless of the actual scrutiny 
applied.”). 
 221. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 282. 
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Second Circuit found sufficient judicial imprimatur for prevailing party 
purposes even though the district court “had not specifically reviewed or 
approved the terms of the settlement agreement.”222 The cases following 
this line of reasoning equate the enforcement remedy, when combined 
with the court’s general mandate to ensure that its orders are fair, as 
sufficing for judicial imprimatur.  
This logic does not hold up because it lacks sufficient specific 
judicial approval of the underlying merits of the suit. In order to satisfy 
Buckhannon, the settlement should have enough judicial imprimatur to 
make it the functional equivalent of a consent decree.223 The level of 
judicial review when simply ensuring that the court’s orders are fair does 
not rise to the level of fairness review when approving of a consent 
decree.224 Settlements such as those in Roberson cannot logically be 
deemed the functional equivalent of consent decrees.225 In a consent 
decree, the judge must not only ensure that the terms of the settlement 
are fair and reasonable, but must make sure that “the proposal represents 
a reasonable factual and legal determination based on the facts of record, 
whether established by evidence, affidavit, or stipulation.”226
3. Proposed “Third-Circuit-plus” test 
This comment proposes that courts adopt a judicial imprimatur test 
for determining prevailing party status that is a combination of the Third 
Circuit’s Truesdell elements plus an explicit approval element, as 
discussed above.227 Specifically, the “Third-Circuit-plus” test consists of 
two prongs: (1) judicial oversight, and (2) judicial approval. The 
oversight prong is satisfied when the four Truesdell elements are met.228 
That is, this prong is satisfied if an order: (a) contains mandatory 
language, (b) is entitled “Order,” (c) is signed by the judge, and (d) 
provides for retained jurisdiction, either through incorporating the terms 
of the settlement or through including a separate “provision ‘retaining 
jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement.”229
 222. Roberson, 346 F.3d at 82. 
 223. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 226. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 227. See supra Part V.C.1–2. 
 228. See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text. 
 229. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). 
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The approval element is satisfied if the trial judge undertakes a 
review of the underlying merits of the claim to determine that the 
corresponding settlement represents a fair conclusion to the dispute.230 
The approval element of this proposed test contemplates that, after 
undertaking such a review, a judge will memorialize the finding, either 
on the record or in writing, that the terms of the settlement are fair to 
both sides based on a review of the merits of the claim. This element 
prevents a party from achieving prevailing party status when its claim 
was merely colorable but potentially meritless.231 This element thus 
satisfies the “merit requirement,” which is a necessary precursor to 
prevailing party status.232
The added merit-review element requires that a judge determine that 
a plaintiff has achieved success on some of the merits of his claim. In 
other words, the judge should review both the terms of the settlement and 
the plaintiff’s underlying claim to ensure that the resolution is 
meritorious.233 This is not an equation of liability to the defendant.234 
Indeed, one reason consent decrees are attractive to defendants is that 
 230. By requiring the judge to make a determination at the time of dismissal, the “Third-
Circuit-plus” test satisfies the Supreme Court’s concern in Farrar that the prevailing party must 
benefit directly from the relief at the time of settlement. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
A similar version of this test has been proposed. See Laura Kendall, Note, The Losing 
Argument Continues for Prevailing Without Winning: A Critical Summary of the Impact of 
Buckhannon on the Catalyst Theory, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 573, 595 (2003) (“[I]n order for a 
‘functional equivalent’ of a consent decree to preserve the stamp of imprimatur required by 
Buckhannon, the court should be required to both endorse the terms of the settlement and explicitly 
retain jurisdiction over the case.”) (citing Reed v. Shenandoah Mem. Hosp., 2002 WL 1964826 , at 
*10 (D. Neb. Aug. 12, 2002) (“A district court approval of a private settlement along with explicit 
retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms makes a settlement the functional equivalent 
of a consent decree, providing the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change of conduct.”)). The 
“Third-Circuit-plus” test provides more detailed guidelines regarding the proposed levels of 
approval and oversight than does Kendall’s proposal. Furthermore, the imprimatur test as envisioned 
by Kendall would allow for prevailing party status when a judge has merely incorporated the terms 
of the settlement into the dismissal order; Kendall’s test does not require a judge to specifically 
review the settlement terms for fairness or to specifically enquire as to the merits of the underlying 
suit. “Third-Circuit-plus” contemplates a more focused review into the merits in order to satisfy the 
Court’s concerns regarding the merit requirement. 
 231. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 218. 
 233. Such a review would satisfy the demands of Supreme Court precedent; namely, a party 
prevails, according to the Court in both Garland and Buckhannon, when it secures: (1) “material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989), and (2) “at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he 
can be said to prevail,” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001).  
 234. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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they do not always entail a declaration of liability or wrongdoing.235 If a 
consent decree entails sufficient judicial imprimatur, then it follows that 
a party’s settlement does not have to include an admission of liability in 
order to be considered a prevailing party. This lack of liability admission 
is distinguishable from a judicial finding that a party’s underlying claim 
was meritorious enough to base prevailing party classification on. It is 
one thing to say that a party’s claims have merit in the settlement context 
and another to say that the defendant bears liability—the latter requiring 
a full adjudication of possible defenses and immunities.  
This judicial finding of merit must be more than that the plaintiff 
stated a colorable claim and that the lawsuit was nonfrivolous.236 The 
level of merit review should be more than that typically undertaken in a 
stipulated dismissal order following a purely private settlement.237 Even 
in situations where the dismissal order incorporates the terms of the 
private settlement into the dismissal order, the judge should undertake a 
significant merit review in order to satisfy the Buckhannon approval 
concern. This judicial inquiry need not be searching or overly exact, but 
it should include sufficient judicial imprimatur on the parties’ resolution 
as called for by the “Third-Circuit-plus” test. 
4. Reasons to adopt “Third-Circuit-plus”: a return to policy 
The circuit split exists in part because the Supreme Court failed to 
provide guidance regarding how much judicial involvement is necessary 
for prevailing party status and also in part because the Court explicitly 
eschewed policy as a basis for striking down the catalyst theory.238 The 
split arose when lower courts attempted to decide what level of judicial 
imprimatur is sufficient for “prevailing party” status in a policy void. 
However, the decision as to how much judicial imprimatur suffices for 
prevailing party status necessarily rests on some form of policy 
determination. If a court believes that plain meaning interpretation, 
 235. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. 
 236. See id. at 605. The Court noted: 
Even under a limited form of the “catalyst theory,” a plaintiff could recover attorney’s 
fees if it established that the complaint had sufficient merit to withstand a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 
This is not the type of legal merit that our prior decisions, based upon plain language and 
congressional intent, have found necessary. 
Id. 
 237. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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regardless of congressional intent, should win the day, then that court 
will likely follow the lead of the Eighth Circuit in restricting the class of 
prevailing parties. On the other hand, if a court believes that 
congressional intent should always trump an overly literalist reading of 
statutory text, then that court will likely follow the Ninth Circuit in 
expanding the prevailing party class as much as possible. The proposed 
“Third-Circuit-plus” test attempts to find a balance between these 
competing views. 
The purpose of the civil rights statutes was to “encourage individuals 
injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief.”239 Congress 
designed the fee-shifting statutes to empower impecunious litigants in 
their dealings with civil rights violators. An overly strict reading of 
Buckhannon, such as that taken by the Eighth Circuit, improperly shifts 
power back to the defendants in civil rights litigation.240 If a plaintiff can 
only receive a fee award from the court by obtaining a judgment on the 
merits or a consent decree, the defendant has leverage in negotiating the 
settlement. The defendant in such situations can, in effect, unduly 
pressure the plaintiff who desires to settle to do so with little or no 
consideration of attorney’s fees.241 Additionally, an overly strict reading 
of Buckhannon “likely would discourage informal settlement and 
increase litigation, which is inefficient.”242 However, the “Third-Circuit-
plus” test shifts the balance of power back to the plaintiffs. If a plaintiff 
can receive a fee award based on a settlement with sufficient judicial 
 239. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); see supra note 63. 
 240. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 28, at n.8 (“[A]ttorneys’ fees are simply another item of 
relief, and if the plaintiff’s right to obtain them is limited, settlements will be biased downward.”). 
 241. In such situations, the defendant knows that the plaintiff can only get court-awarded 
attorney’s fees if it reaches at least a consent decree. Therefore, the defendant has an incentive not to 
include attorney’s fees in any potential settlement that is not stylized as a consent decree. The 
defendant may simply refuse to agree to submit the settlement to the court as a consent decree. A 
similar line of reasoning was recognized in the special education context following Buckhannon. See 
Weber, supra note 160, at 398–99 (concluding that the plaintiff’s “natural response [in such a 
situation] is to split some of the difference between the fees and the offered services, accepting less 
of either or both”). 
 242. Macon Dandridge Miller, Comment, Catalysts as Prevailing Parties Under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1347, 1370 (2002) (“[Strict application of] Buckhannon’s 
rule likely would discourage informal settlement and increase litigation, which is inefficient. Instead 
of settling a case out of court with its opponent, a party may be compelled to continue with 
litigation—consuming judicial resources and increasing costs—in order to recover attorney’s fees.”); 
see also Steuer, supra note 21, at 82–83 (“A looser interpretation of Buckhannon could mitigate its 
pernicious effects by allowing more private settlements to qualify as the functional equivalent of a 
consent decree.”). 
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imprimatur, attorney’s fees reenter the equation during settlement 
negotiations.243
At the same time, courts also do not have the leeway after 
Buckhannon to stretch the term “prevailing party” beyond its plain 
meaning.244 There is a competing tension between expanding the class of 
prevailing parties in order to satisfy congressional policy and the 
Supreme Court’s adherence to plain meaning of the term “prevailing 
party.”245 While civil rights legislative policy urges an expansive reading 
of prevailing parties beyond those that secure a judgment on the merits or 
a consent decree, the Court’s rule in Buckhannon urges that courts not 
expand the class too far. Specifically, a party to a private settlement can 
only be termed a prevailing party when the settlement bears sufficient 
judicial imprimatur, which only occurs when a court has both approved 
of the settlement terms against the backdrop of the underlying merits of 
the claim and retained jurisdiction to enforce those terms. The “Third-
Circuit-plus” test is designed to expand the class of prevailing parties 
while adhering faithfully to the Supreme Court’s guidance in 
Buckhannon. Accommodating both of these competing interests requires 
allowing prevailing party status when a party has something less than a 
consent decree but more than a purely private settlement.246
 243. The reasoning of this situation is the reverse of the discussion in note 241, supra. If the 
plaintiff does not depend so much on the cooperation of the defendant to receive attorney’s fees, the 
defendant must now consider the amount of fees in the settlement negotiation or else will be forced 
to litigate to conclusion. 
 244. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598 at 610 (2001) (“Given the clear meaning of ‘prevailing party’ in the fee-shifting statutes, 
we need not determine which way these various policy arguments cut. . . . To disregard the clear 
legislative language and the holdings of our prior cases on the basis of such policy arguments would 
be [an impermissible] assumption of a roving [judicial] authority.” (citation omitted)). 
 245. Commentators have derided the Court’s decision in Buckhannon and in other cases as a 
general assault on the private attorney general regime. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 2, at 186 (“[T]he 
Court has launched a wholesale assault on one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for 
enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general.”); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: 
The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 372 (2002) 
(“[T]he narrow majority of the Court has rejected settled interpretations of federal civil rights laws to 
limit the protection that Congress has sought to give to the civil and economic rights of many 
vulnerable people, including older people, people with disabilities, women, and working people.”). 
 246. See supra Part V.C.1–3. 
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D. Applying “Third-Circuit-Plus” to Bloomberg and Barrios 
1. The Bloomberg plaintiffs would prevail under “Third-Circuit-plus” 
Applying the “Third-Circuit-plus” formulation to the facts of 
Bloomberg demonstrates that the settlement agreement was sufficient to 
confer prevailing party status. The district court’s dismissal met the 
Truesdell elements for sufficient judicial “oversight”: it was entitled 
“Order”247 and specifically retained jurisdiction over the parties to 
enforce the settlement agreement.248 While the record does not so 
indicate, this Comment assumes that the district court’s dismissal order 
contained mandatory language and was signed by the district court judge, 
not the parties’ attorneys. 
To pass muster under the “Third-Circuit-plus” test, the Bloomberg 
settlement would also need to have sufficient judicial merit review. 
Settlements in class action suits require the judge to undertake a “fairness 
review.”249 Various circuits have different multifactor tests for 
determining if a proposed class action settlement is fair.250 Some circuits 
include factors that implicitly require a judge to look at the merits of the 
underlying claims.251 For example, in the Eighth Circuit district courts 
determining the fairness of a class action settlement must consider a 
variety of factors, including “the probability of success in the 
litigation.”252 Assuming the trial judge in Bloomberg followed proper 
procedure and undertook such a review, the settlement would qualify the 
Bloomberg plaintiffs as prevailing parties under the approval prong of 
the “Third-Circuit-plus” test.253 While the district court’s opinion 
granting attorney’s fees254 did not mention a specific inquiry into the 
 247. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (D.S.D. 2001), rev’d, 315 F.3d 
990 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
 250. See 8 MOORE, supra note 44, § 23.85[1] (compiling cases and listing various multifactor 
tests that various courts apply). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Lambert v. Flight Transp. Corp. (In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 730 F.2d 1128, 
1135 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 253. See also Weber, supra note 160, at 406 (“[C]ase law supports the proposition that judicial 
approval of a class settlement suffices for a judicial imprimatur on the alteration of the legal relation 
of the parties.”) (citing Nat’l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272 
(N.D. Fla. 2001)). 
 254. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1094 (D.S.D. 2001). 
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merits, it did indicate that “the Settlement Agreement appears adequately 
to deal with many of the due process and confinement issues discussed in 
the Complaint.”255 Because Bloomberg would be a case in which both 
approval and oversight elements were satisfied, the Eighth Circuit 
incorrectly focused only on the form of the judicial order, and not on the 
material alteration of the parties’ relationship, to determine that 
prevailing party status was not satisfied.  
2. The Barrios plaintiff would not prevail under “Third-Circuit-plus” 
While the Eighth Circuit interpreted the class of prevailing parties 
too narrowly, the Ninth Circuit in its decisions following Buckhannon 
interpreted the class too broadly. Under the proposed “Third-Circuit-
plus” test, Barrios is a case in which there would not be enough judicial 
imprimatur on that change in the legal relationship to satisfy prevailing 
party status. 
Specifically, Barrios fails to satisfy the oversight prong of “Third-
Circuit-plus” test. The order dismissing the lawsuit did not contain 
mandatory language and did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the 
settlement terms.256 The Ninth Circuit found dispositive the fact that the 
settlement agreement provided “that the district court would retain 
jurisdiction over the issue of attorneys’ fees, thus providing sufficient 
judicial oversight to justify an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.”257 
However, an agreement between the parties that a court will 
subsequently decide the issue of attorney’s fees does not equate to actual 
judicial oversight as contemplated by Buckhannon. Nothing in the 
Barrios settlement or dismissal provided for continued jurisdiction over 
the settlement terms. Barrios also fails the “Third-Circuit-plus” approval 
prong. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial judge reviewed the 
settlement terms to determine whether the plaintiff was succeeding on 
any meritorious claims.258
Applying the “Third-Circuit-plus” test to both Bloomberg and 
Barrios reveals that neither of these cases was properly resolved under a 
faithful reading of Buckhannon. Application of the proposed test reveals 
that the Eighth Circuit improperly denied attorney’s fees whereas the 
Ninth Circuit improperly awarded attorney’s fees. Buckhannon was 
 255. Id. at 1097. 
 256. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 257. Id. at 1134 n.5. 
 258. Id. at 1133. 
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concerned that a party be classified as prevailing only when the 
resolution to its suit contained sufficient judicial imprimatur, or approval 
and oversight. Adoption of the “Third-Circuit-plus” test throughout the 
circuits would properly balance congressional fee-shifting goals with the 
Court’s adherence to plain meaning. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Circuit courts have split three ways in determining just how much 
judicial sanctioning a party must secure to become a prevailing party. By 
conferring prevailing party status on private settlement participants when 
the court order contains 1) mandatory language, 2) the title “Order,” 3) 
the signature of the judge, and 4) retention of jurisdiction to enforce the 
terms of the settlement agreement, the Third Circuit comes closest to 
satisfying the Supreme Court’s concerns about judicial imprimatur, while 
avoiding the overly harsh or overly broad constructions adopted by the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. However, this test should be augmented by a 
merits-review element requiring courts to examine the degree of 
alteration in the parties’ legal relationship in order to fully comply with 
the proposed “Third-Circuit-plus” judicial imprimatur test. 
In order to bring clarity to the issue, courts should adopt a 
“prevailing party” test that implicates both judicial approval and 
oversight by focusing on whether a dismissing court conducted a “merit” 
review of the settlement and retained jurisdiction of the settlement’s 
enforcement. Until uniformity is achieved, practitioners should inform 
themselves of and comply with the requirements for “prevailing party” 
status in their respective jurisdictions prior to finalizing the judicial 
involvement in a potential settlement. By adopting a clear rule for when 
a party “prevails,” courts may still promote the policy concerns of the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act while adhering to the plain 
meaning of the term “prevailing party” in federal fee-shifting statutes. 
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